Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 54

Issue 3

Article 9

1966

To Catch a Bootlegger
Robert J. Greene
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Greene, Robert J. (1966) "To Catch a Bootlegger," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 54: Iss. 3, Article 9.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol54/iss3/9

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL

[Vol. 54,

TO CATCH A BOOTLEGGER
INTRODUCTION
Around chapter 242 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes' [hereinafter referred to as KRS] revolves a continuing battle between its
violators and those who seek to enforce it. Over the years, attempts
to evade the local option laws in dry territory have produced, on the
one hand, masters of deception, who very cleverly devise methods by
which to transport contraband liquor through dry territory for illegal
sale. These methods have included such schemes as constructing
secret compartments beneath the floor of an automobile, sending a
speeding car ahead of the "load" in order to distract any police officers who might be lurking ahead, traveling miles off the normal
route over back roads to avoid police, and even transporting in gasoline
trucks. On the other hand, attempts to enforce local option laws in
dry territory have produced masters of detection. Law enforcement
officials have countered with equal ingenuity. However, they have at
times stepped dangerously over that fine line which separates legal
and illegal searches and seizures. Consequently, a large area of the
law of search and seizure is now concerned with the restraint and
search of automobiles and the seizure of illegal cargo. This body of
law and its proper application has been quite controversial.
The controversy centers around the following language in the
United States Constitution and similar language in section ten of the
Kentucky Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath of affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the things to be seized.2
Applying this constitutional provision to searches of automobiles,
no warrant is needed if there is probable cause to believe that the
automobile is carrying illegal cargo.a Apparently because of the lack
of an exact definition of probable cause, 4 police officers have resorted
to another method of conducting searches without a search warrant;
recently they have been employing the doctrine of search incident to
an arrest 5
1 This chapter provides for local option elections on the issue of prohibition
of the sale of alcoholic beverages. See KRS 242.370 for the section dealing
specifically with search and seizure.
2 U.S. Const. amend. IV.
a Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
4 "The variety of situations makes the statement of a definite, concise, universal rule extremely difficult, if not impossible." 52 Ky. L.J. 488, 489 (1964).
5See Tabor v. Commonwealth, 380 S.W.2d 245 (Ky. 1964).
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Recently, in the short span of four months, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals handed down three cases of major importance dealing with
search for and seizure of contraband liquor in dry local option territory.6 It is the purpose of this article to analyze and assess the impact
of these new decisions on the power of the police in enforcing the local
option laws in dry territory and their impact on the constitutional
rights of motorists.
THE PERSON

The first of these cases, Lane v. Commonwealth7 involved a conviction of the defendant for transporting alcoholic beverages for the
purpose of sale in dry territory, pursuant to KRS 242.230. The defendant was arrestd by a state trooper for improper passing. The
trooper, after placing the defendant in his police cruiser, returned and
searched the car, wherein he found contraband liquor. The car was
owned by the defendant's wife. From these facts, the court laid down
twvo significant points of law.
One point involved the nature of the offense which permits a
search incident to an arrest. This will be taken up later in detail in
connection with another Kentucky case. The other point made by the
court overrules a long line of Kentucky cases holding that only the
owner of an automobile can object to an illegal search of it."
Only a few months before the Lane case, in Brown v. Commonwealth,0 the court said:
Although... Brown was driving the car at the time, he was not its
owner. Kenneth Locke had borrowed the car for the trip and, as he
was in charge of it, he appears to have been the only person if any,

who could have complained of an illegal search; and the record does
not reveal that Locke objected to the search of the automobile.
This Court has held in a long line of cases that an automobile
guest, and such was Brown, is not in a position to object to the search
of such vehicle without a warrant.10 (Emphasis added.)

The Brown case was unclear on one point: it did not answer the

question, since it was not before the court, of whether Locke, who had
borrowed the car from its owner, could object to an illegal search of
it. The court, distinguishing a borrower from a guest, intimated that
if he could object then it was because it was he who had borrowed the
'Lane v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W2d 743 (Ky. 1964). See also, Conn v.
Commonwealth, 387 S.W.2d 285 (Ky. 1965); Clark v. Commonwealth, 388
S.W.2d 622 (Ky. 1965).
7 386 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1964).
8
Smith v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 242 (Ky. 1964); Combs v. Commonwealth, 341 SAV.2d 774 (1960); Pruitt v. Commonwealth, 286 S.W.2d 551
(Ky. 1955); West v. Commonwealth, 273 Ky. 779, 117 S.W.2d 998 (1938).

9,378 S.W.2d 608 (Ky. 1964).
10 Id. at 611.
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car. Thus, the court seemed to suggest in the Brown case that it would
allow one who borrows an automobile to object to its illegal search.
If the court in the Brown case did intend to make such a distinction,
then it is not overruled by the holding in Lane v. Commonwealth because in the Lane case the defendant was not merely a guest, but had
borrowed the car from its owner, who was the defendant's wife. Therefore, although it is made clear in the Lane case that one need not be
the owner of an automobile to object to its unlawful search, the
question still remains as to what interest one must have to object. If
the interest of an owner is not necessary to give a person standing to
object, then what lesser interest will suffice?
Perhaps the answer to this perplexing question can be found by
looking more closely at the court's opinion in the Lane case. In the
opinion the court cites Jones v. United States."- The Kentucky court
said of the Jones case:
[T]he Court thoroughly examined the question of the amount of interest
a person must have in the premises or other possessions before he is in
a position to object to a seizure, and subsequently have the evidence
obtained suppressed by proper motion. After discussion of the special
problems that had arisen in the past concerning distinctions among
various classes of owners, and in some instances proprietors of property,
the Court concluded that it was unnecessary and ill-advised to import
into the law of the right to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure, 'subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law
in evolving the body of private property law which, more than almost
any other branch of12law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity
is largely historical.'

In the Jones case, the petitioner had been convicted on a narcotics
charge, largely on the basis of illegally seized evidence procured from
an apartment in which the petitioner was staying as a guest of the
lessee of the apartment. Justice Frankfnter, speaking for the Court,
took the position that distinctions such as those between "lessee,"
"licensee," "invitee" and "guest" were weak distinctions and should not
be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to
constitutional safeguards. 1a Accordingly, the Court held that although
those wrongfully present upon the premises cannot invoke the privacy
of the premises by a motion to suppress the use as evidence of property
seized in a search of the premises, anyone legitimately on the premises
where a search occurs may challenge the legality of the search by way
of a motion to suppress when the fruits of the search are proposed to
be used against him. Therefore, applying the above language to the
facts of the Brown case, the defendant would have standing to move to
11363 U.S. 257 (1960).
1 Lane v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d at 747.
1'Jones v. United States, 363 U.S. at 266.
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suppress the use of the illegally seized evidence against him. It would
seem, from the mere fact that the Kentucky court relies heavily on the
Jones case, that a mere guest in an automobile as was Brown would
be able to have illegally seized evidence suppressed under the
authority of Lane v. Commonwealth.
However, the problem is not so easily solved because immediately
after discussing the Jones case, the Kentucky court said:
When we return to the facts of the instant case we find that appellant,
Cecil Lane, was in complete control and possession of the car searched.
There is some secondary proof in the record that the car was registered
in his wife's name, but this proof does not have the high quality of
primary evidence. We have concluded therefore that his interest was
such that even though he was not the owner, he was entitled
to have the
14
evidence obtained by reason of the search suppressed.

Here, the court placed significance on the fact that the defendant
who was seeking to suppress the evidence was the automobile owner's
husband. Consequently, it is difficult to predict how the Kentucky
court will go when it is called upon to decide whether a mere guest
in an automobile has standing to move for the suppression of ililegally
seized evidence. There does, however, seem to be a definite trend
toward a holding in the guest's favor in Kentucky. To so hold would
require a liberal interpretation of constitutional provisions, in view of
the fact that the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution
and section ten of the Kentucky Constitution guarantees the right of
people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects. Since the word "their"is in
the possessive case, a strict interpretation of the fourth amendment and
of section ten would require that the person at least have the right
to possession of the automobile which was searched; however, it seems
that the court should look at the spirit of these provisions rather than
the exact wording in construing them. The spirit of the constitutional
guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure is one of freedom
from tyrannical methods of law enforcement which will offer government officials the opportunity of becoming too powerful. Its purpose is
to deter foceful seizures of evidence. To hold that a guest could not
object to such searches and seizures would greatly impair this purpose.
Should a free citizen be any less secure from Gestapo-type police
tactics in the home or automobile of his friend than he is in his own?
TAE OFFENSE

The other point of major importance made by the court in the
Lane case, as already mentioned, involved the nature of the offense.
14 Lane v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d at 747.
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The court held that an arrest for a minor traffic violation will not allow
an officer to search an automobile without a search warrant. The
violation involved was improper passing. The court said:
It is our opinion that when a person is arrested for a traffic or other
minor violation, the mere fact of the arrest does not give to the officer
absolute right to search the vehicle or the premises indiscriminately. It
would be impossible to lay down a rule which would apply to all conditions and all states of facts and this opinion should not be construed to
mean that a person in custody may not be searched in order to be
disarmed, or to prevent escape or the immediate destruction of
evidence for which he was detained.' 5 (Emphasis added.)

This statement by the court immediately raises the question of
where the court will draw the line. As the court indicated, this holding
does not prevent an officer from searching, incident to an arrest to
disarm or to prevent the destruction of evidence, a person in custody.
Therefore it would seem that the court does draw at least one line
between those taken into custody and those to whom citations are
issued. This observation is borne out by the more recent case of
Conn v. Commonwealth.'6 In that case, the defendant was stopped by
a state trooper on a routine check for operators' licenses. Although the
defendant produced an operator's license, he was unable to produce the
registration receipt for the truck he was driving. Thereupon, the
trooper issued a citation which directed the defendant to appear
before the county judge at a later date. The state trooper then procured an invalid search warrant from the judge pro tempore and
discovered sixty-three cases of beer in the defendant's truck in violation
of the local option law. The Commonwealth argued that even if the
warrant was invalid, the search was legal because it was incident to
an arrest. The Court of Appeals held that the search was not valid as
incident to an arrest, holding that a citation is not an arrest and concluding that a search incident to a citation is illegal. What the court
said then, in the Conn case, is simply that there can be no search without a warrant where there has been no arrest. There is no question
but that there must be an arrest in order for an officer to make a
search without a warrant.' 7 Simple as this point made in the Conn
case may seem, it is of great significance because up to that time it
was prevalent practice among law enforcement officers in carrying out
the local option laws in dry territory to follow a suspected transporter
of contraband liquor until he committed some minor traffic violation
for which they would issue a citation and then proceed to search the
Id. at 745.
16 387 S.W.2d 285 (Ky. 1965).
17Johnson v. Commonwealth, 304 Ky. 490, 200 S.W.2d 913 (1947);
Congleton v. Commonwealth, 273 Ky. 282, 116 S.W.2d 800 (1938).
'5
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automobile. Such practice obviously is only a pretext to search for
evidence.
The Conn case does not, however, solve the problem of where the
line will be drawn when there has been an arrest for a traffic violation.
There can be no hard and fast rule but there can be standards. In the
Lane case, the court lays down a standard which hits at the crux of
the problem. The court cited a recent Wisconsin case, 18 which refers
to the statement of the United States Supreme Court that "an arrest
may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence."19 In the Lefkowitz case, Justice Butler puts in a nutshell the policy behind such a
standard:
The authority of officers to search one's house or place of business
contemporaneously with his lawful arrest therein upon a valid warrant
of arrest certainly is not greater than that conferred by a search warrant issued upon adequate proof and sufficiently describing the premises
and the things sought to be obtained. Indeed, the informed and deliberate
determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants as to what
searches and seizures are permissible under the Constitution are to be
preferred over the hurried action of officers and others who may happen
to make arrests. Security against unlawful searches is more likely to be
attained by resort to search warrants than by reliance upon the caution
and sagacity of petty officers while acting under
the excitement that
20
attends the capture of persons accused of crime.

Consequently, Kentucky has interpreted, in part at least, the
meaning of the word "unreasonable" as used in section ten of the
Kentucky Constitution and in the fourth amendment of the United
States Constitution, to make illegal a search incident to an arrest where
the arrest is only a pretext for the search. Such a rule is the proper one
since the purpose of allowing a search incident to a valid arrest is to
enable an officer to "take from his [the prisoner's] person and hold
for the disposition of the court any property connected with the offense for which he is arrested that may be used as evidence against
him, or any weapon or thing that might enable the prisoner to escape
or do some act of violence ... ."21 This standard, that where an arrest
is made as a pretext to search for evidence the search is unreasonable,
is strict enough to prevent Gestapo-type police tactics from being
practiced by Kentucky police officers, yet at the same time it is flexible
enough to carry out the purposes of the doctrine of search incident to
an arrest. Although it is true that it may impair apprehension of
criminals in general and enforcement of local option laws in dry territory in particular, it is a reflection of the sound American principle
Is Barnes v. State, 25 Wis. 2d 116, 130 N.W.2d 264 (1964).
19 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932).
"2OId. at 464.
21
Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S.W. 860, 863 (1920).
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that the ends alone can never be justification for the means employed
to attain those ends.
Tm RBsThAurT

A third recent Kentucky case dealing with search and seizure of
automobiles is Clark v. Commonwealth.22 This case involved a conviction of the defendant for transporting alcoholic beverages for sale
in dry local option territory. Two Kentucky state troopers, while on
routine duty traveling from Harlan to Cumberland, noticed that the
defendant's car was setting very low in the back and that it seemed to
weave slightly, although one of the troopers testified that at the time
they stopped the defendant's car, he did not formulate any idea as
to what the contents of the automobile might be. There was also testimony that the defendant's reputation was bad for trafficking illegally
in alcoholic beverages. Walking up to the defendant's car, one trooper
saw "without strain" that there was a quantity of liquor in the car.
Thereupon the defendant was arrested and a search revealed more
liquor in large amounts in the trunk of the automobile.
The case presented no question as to the legality of the subsequent
arrest and search because it is well-settled in Kentucky that, as the
court stated, "The constitutional guaranty which affords protection
from an illegal search does not prohibit a seizure without a warrant
where there is no need of a search; that is, where the outlawed object
discovered is visible, open and obvious to anyone who even casually
looks about his surroundings." 23 This statement is in accord with Kentucky precedent.2 4 However, there was a problem in the case as to the
legality of the restraint of the defendant. If the restraint of the defendant was illegal, then its illegality would render the subsequent
arrest and search illegal and the evidence inadmissible. The court, in
holding that the restraint was not illegal, said:
We conclude no ulterior motive or special pretext was shown as a
reason for stopping appellants car; futhermore, a bonafide cause was
established for the stopping. Therefore, the discovery from mere observation of the alcoholic beverages in his automobile made his arrest legal
competent evidence to
and, in consequence, made the contraband liquor
25
be used in the charge preferred against him.

The court relied upon Commonwealth v. Robey, 26 which, according to
Judge Montgomery's dissenting opinion in the Clark case, does not
22 388 S.W.2d 622 (Ky. 1965).
23 Id. at 624.
24Hancock v. Commonwealth, 262 S.W.2d 670 (Ky. 1953); Wilson v.
Commonwealth, 258 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1953).
25 Clark v. Commonwealth, 388 S.W.2d at 625.
26 337 S.W.2d 34 (Ky. 1960).
27 Clark v. Commonwealth, 388 S.W.2d at 625.
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support the holding of the majority. The Robey case involved the arrest
of the defendant for drunken driving. The issue was whether or not the
arresting officers had legally stopped the automobile which the defendant was operating. In that case, the court laid down a rule of law
governing the stopping of automobiles. The court said:
Since the evidence in the instant case was not obtained by virtue of
a search there is no question of a violation of the constitutional right to
protection against unlawful search. If the evidence is to be held inadmissible, then, it can be only because of violation of some right of
the motorist not to be stopped. While we are not aware of any precedent for holding that evidence obtained as a result of an officer's
merely stopping a person is inadmissible, we feel that due respect for
the basic right of liberty (Ky. Const. See. 1) should afford some protection against the unjustified or unreasonable stopping of a person by
a police officer. Accordingly, it is our view that if an officer stops a
motorist without bona fide cause any evidence obtained as a result of
the search should be 28considered to have been illegally obtained and
therefore inadmissible.

Judge Montgomery in his dissenting opinion in the Clark case
distinguished the Robey case by saying:
The Robey case affords no comfort. There, the driver was legally
arrested for a violation of the reckless driving statute and on this basis
it is distinguishable. There is no claim in the case at bar that appellant
was arrested for reckless driving despite the trooper's statement that
"....

the car seemed to have a little weave to it."29

It is true that the cases are distinguishable. But this does not
make the Clark case wrong. Nowhere is it required that there be an
arrest in order to establish that there was a "bona fide cause" for stopping a motorist. The genuineness of the cause exists in the mind of
the trooper at the time of the stopping. As the majority opinion points
out, there is a "bona fide cause" for stopping a motorist where he is
driving in an erratic manner. The court pointed out the following:
In the case at bar appellant was observed by the troopers to be "having
some difficulty" and his car "seemed to have a little weave to it." This,
we believe under the authority of the Robey case, was enough irregularity
in the way he handled his car to give the officers a bona fide cause to
stop him. KRS 189.730(1) provides, so far as applicable here, that any
trooper ".

.

. may, at any time, upon reasonable cause to believe that a

motor vehicle is unsafe or not equipped as required by law, or that its
equipment is not in proper adjustment or repair, require the driver of
such motor vehicle to stop and submit such vehicle to an inspection and
such test with reference thereto as may be appropriate."30

Judge Montgomery, on the other hand, asserted that justification
of the stopping by the troopers here on the basis of KRS 189.730(1)
28

Commonwealth v. Robey, 337 S.W.2d at 36.
29 Clark v. Commonwealth, 388 S.W.2d at 625.
30 Id. at 624.
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"falls into the category of pretext or subterfuge condemned in the
Mitchell case."31 That case, Commonwealth v. Mitchell,3 held that
although it is legal for troopers to engage in the systematic and indiscriminate stopping of all motor traffic on the highway for the good faith
purpose of inspecting drivers' licenses, it cannot be done where there
is an ulterior motive of circumventing the constitutional safeguards
against unreasonable searches. Therefore, it seems that the major
question in the Clark case on which Judge Montgomery and the
majority of the court were in disagreement was whether or not under
the facts of that particular case the troopers had a bona fide cause
for stopping the defendant, wtih Judge Montgomery basing his
opinion that there was no bona fide cause chiefly on the fact that the
troopers had not arrested the defendant for reckless driving or any
other traffic violation. That this was Judge Montgomery's main objection is also indicated by his statement that "The Supreme Court has
recently condemned the stopping of a motor vehicle with neither an
arrest warrant nor a search warrant." 3 He was referring to Beck v.
Ohio,8 4 a very recent case decided by the United State Supreme
Court. In the Beck case the issue was completely different from
the issues in the Clark, Robey, and Mitchell cases. In Beck, the defendant was pulled over to the curb, arrested, and taken to the police
station where the police searched his person and found a number of
clearing house slips. As the court said, "The constitutional validity of
the search in this case, then, must depend upon the constitutional
validity of the petitioner's arrest."35 In other words, the issue was
whether at the time of the arrest, the officers had probable cause to
make the arrest.The issue of what kind of cause would permit officers
to merely stop a motor vehicle was not before the court. The Clark case
is quite distinguishable, for there the question was whether a slight
weaving of an automobile gave the troopers a bona fide cause to
stop, the automobile under the authority of KRS 189.730(1). If so,
then the arrest was not invalid in this respect since some contraband
liquor was laying in the car in plain view of the troopers when
they approached the car.36
Consequently, the holding in Clark v. Commonwealth should not
31Id. at 626.
82355 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1962).
33 Clark v. Commonwealth, 888 S.W.2d at 626.
34379 U.S. 89 (1964).
35 Id. at 91.
36 It should be noted that the court reversed Clark on the ground that Clark
was charged with transporting, which cannot be proved by possession alone. But
the question with which we are concerned is whether or not there was a bona fide
cause to stop the defendant's automobile.
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shock the conscience of the avid supporter of the right to travel upon
the highways without unreasonable restraint by police officers. At a
time when travel upon the highways is a major health hazard, it should
not be a discomfort to know that police officers have the authority to
stop and investigate an automobile which seems to be weaving down
the highway. Nor should one feel that his hard-won liberty is being
infringed upon when an officer, while engaged in such an investigation and upon seeing contraband cargo laying in the car seat, makes an
arrest for transporting such cargo. On the contrary, would not one be
shocked if a trooper was forced to proceed with his investigation as if
he never saw the illegal cargo because the courts would refuse to admit
it into evidence?
CONCLUSION

Thus, Kentucky has laid down significant rules of law in the
area of search and seizure in these three recent cases. Although these
cases do reflect to some degree a trend toward greater judicial protection of a citizen's rights to travel upon the highways free from
unreasonable interference by police officers, those upon whom the
duty falls to enforce the dry local option laws should not be discouraged. On the contrary, they should take pride in the fact that
these high standards imposed by the court to serve as guidelines in
making arrests and searches place them among police forces with the
highest standards of practice in the world.
The cases discussed in this article doubtlessly restrict Kentucky
police forces in their enforcement of the dry local option laws. Law
enforcement officials should react positively by devoting more time
and energy toward improving the effectiveness of methods which do
not contravene constitutional guarantees. By beginning at the very
base of the law enforcement hierarchy, law enforcement officials
should institute new programs for thoroughly training all police officers in the application of new methods of crime detection. Obviously,
such programs would take a great deal of the taxpayers' dollars, but ininstead of asking whether we can afford them, one should ask whether
we can afford to sacrifice hard-won freedoms in exchange for the
easier and less expensive methods of law enforcement which subject
every citizen to harassment from police officers. Recent Kentucky
cases demonstrate that the Kentucky Court of Appeals is awakening to
the ideal that liberty is far more important than the capture and conviction of one bootlegger.
Robert J. Greene

